Tuesday, March 8, 2016

Central banks monetary policies have not been helpful

To stress that central bank credibility is draining fast and, assuming that the BOJ and ECB go again this month, I now see a risk of a breakdown in markets and outcomes that are the opposite of what central bankers are trying – and have been failing for over seven years now – to achieve, i.e. nominal GDP at 5%, EVEN IF THIS 5% CONSISTS OF 0% REAL AND ALL 5% FROM INFLATION. 

We are entering an extremely worrying time and we have got here even faster that I had feared – a place where monetary policy and central banks become the problem and not the cure. 



The Fed is in a hole of its own making by using self-serving metrics to fix a debt and asset bubble crisis with a policy that relies on more debt and even bigger asset bubbles. But in the short term – this next month – I am concerned that markets will react badly and contrary to policymaker expectations when both the BOJ and the ECB attempt to ease further this month. I suspect the ECB and the BOJ are – as far as markets are concerned – “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t” with any residual credibility likely to decay away this month. But both institutions should realise this is down to their own mistakes, whereby (like the Fed) they have sought to fix the ills of excessive debt, asset bubbles and a lack of competitiveness thorough policies which merely result in a zero-sum outcomes (FX wars) and/or which rely on the “greater fool” theory requiring “someone” to take on more debt to continually speculate on an un-burstable asset price bubble. 

Sadly, of course, mankind has so far failed to create un-burstable bubbles, especially where the underlying foundations are so flimsy. This competitiveness issue is global and critical. Since the global financial crisis (GFC) very little production capacity reduction has been allowed to occur in the Developed Markets (courtesy of QE and ZIRP, which together facilitate the avoidance of default cycles, which are central to reducing capacity). At the same time, globally, particularly in places like China and in industries like Energy and Shipping, we have seen significant production capacity added since the global financial crisis. 

Again, in part due to QE and ZIRP policies in Developed Markets. Of course, this would be less of a problem if global aggregate demand growth had increased strongly over the last seven years, but this has clearly not happened. In particular, the debt-driven consumption frenzy of the years leading up to the global financial crisis in the Developed Markets has barely come back, while at the same time demand growth in the EM sphere has been much slower than hoped for (and needed), and latterly severe economic downturns in places like Russia, China, the Middle East and Brazil have hampered this handover even more. So the response to all of this has been the zero-sum game referred to above, FX wars, which merely operate to allow temporary and transitory relative shifts in competitiveness but with severe (unintended?) consequences.

For now, I have decided to stick with what I published in January, but now I think we are facing an even more difficult 2016 than I had anticipated at the outset of this year.